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INTRODUCTION
The recent attention to catastrophic health care, mandatory health insur-
ance and the "health insurance gap" have focused on the problems of pro-
viding adequately for the physical health needs of Americans.' Lost in the
debate, as it has so often been, is the problem of providing for mental health
services.2 The failure to consider mental health services' needs is expensive
in terms of human and social problems that unnecessarily go unresolved. 3 It
also may be expensive in terms of physical health care costs; there is increas-
ing evidence that mental health and physical health care are closely related
and the failure to provide for mental health services may drive up the costs
of physical health care.4
This Article reviews the need (met and unmet) for mental health services,
the value of providing for better mental health services, mechanisms for de-
livering and paying for mental health services, government-sponsored
mental health programs, licensing of mental health professionals and other
legal limitations on those who can provide certain mental health services,
and the prospects for future mental health services.
The thesis of the Article is that there has been, and is, a large unmet need
for mental health services in America, and that the mental health care deliv-
ery system has been so poorly put together that it is incapable of meeting a
major portion of the need for services. Indeed, the term "system" is unwar-
ranted if it implies the existence of a single, organized or integrated mecha-
nism of providing mental health care services. In fact, the "system" is
fragmented, inconsistent from part-to-part, and full of holes, so that a con-
1. E.g., Higgins & Meyers, The Economic Transformation of American Health Insur-
ance: Implications for the Hospital Industry, 11 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 21 (1986);
Robinson & Luft, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care, 1972-1982, 257 J.A.M.A. 3241
(1987); Zook, Moore & Zeckhauser, "Catastrophic" Health Insurance-A Misguided Prescrip-
tion?, 62 PuB. INTEREST 66 (1981).
2. The provision of mental health services since World War II has improved, but services
are still not available to many, including those who need them most. See infra notes 50-99 and
accompanying text.
3. If mental health care can reduce mental illness, then the failure to provide mental
health services will increase the level of mental illness in society. This untreated illness can
reasonably be expected to increase such antisocial activity as child abuse, criminal conduct,
absenteeism, underemployment and unemployment, family abandonment, and drug and alco-
hol abuse.
4. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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siderable portion of those needing mental health services do not receive
them.
Contributing to the failure of the system have been years of neglect and a
series of private and governmental mistakes. In reality, mental health care
delivery is a product of political, social, and economic forces that too often
have not taken adequate account of the needs of those the system should be
serving. Federal government policies have changed with administrations
and, therefore, have been shifting and inconsistent. Insurance reimburse-
ment schemes have often been antagonistic to mental health care and have
traditionally limited reimbursement to services provided by (or under the
direction of) physicians, in part reflecting a strong medical bias on the part
of the major health insurance providers and in part reflecting the difficulty of
determining what mental health care is legitimate. The professions have not
established the scientific bases for the success or failure of various types of
mental health treatments and have too often been engaged in turf-protecting
wars. In addition, the licensing system is inadequate to assure reasonably
competent and honest practice.
The prospects for providing better mental health care in the future will be
bright only if there are changes in the attitudes of those who provide reim-
bursement for health services (the government, employers, and private insur-
ers), and if mental health professionals more carefully define essential and
effective mental health services. Those who directly pay for services must be
convinced that mental health services are a means of reducing total health
care costs. Certain forms of psychotherapy must be recognized as mecha-
nisms for dealing with serious emotional problems rather than a form of
personal development or "growth" therapy. The forms of therapy that are
effective must be identified. Licensing procedures must be improved to help
ensure that only reasonably competent practitioners are licensed. The
mental health professions must be able to establish "standard" practices that
are based on effective therapy.
The mental health care delivery system is the means by which society de-
termines what services will be available, their quality, who will receive them,
their cost, and their financing. Mental health care delivery is rarely like a
free, competitive market economy. A number of factors interfere with the
operation of pure competition. For example, there is no free access to
mental health markets (e.g., licensing is required), patients do not have com-
plete knowledge of the various services available and their efficacy, and in-
surance and other third-party payers warp normal costing and demand
principles. Even with the increased emphasis on promoting some competi-
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tion-like aspects of health care, which started in the early 1980s, the system
is far from a freely competitive market.
THE DEMAND FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
The Incidence of Mental Illness
At least 15 percent to 20 percent of the population is currently in need of
mental health services, and a third of us will experience a significant mental
disorder at some point. The President's Commission on Mental Health re-
ported that at any given time, about 15 percent of the population of the
United States is in need of some form of mental health services.5 More re-
cently, a study of mental conditions in the country has revealed that over a
six-month period, 17 percent to 23 percent of the population may suffer a
psychiatric or emotional condition (based broadly on DSM-III categories).6
Furthermore, about one-third of the population (ranging from 29 percent to
38, percent) has experienced a psychiatric or emotional condition during
their lifetimes (again, based broadly on DSM-III categories in three metro-
politan areas).7 These studies suggest a huge need for mental health services,
much of which goes unmet.8
General health care service costs have increased significantly. Health care
costs now exceed 11 percent of the gross national product, and they continue
to grow.9 By the mid-1980s, American corporations paid more in health
insurance premiums than they paid to shareholders in dividends, ° and
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, Report of the President's Commis-
sion on Mental Health (1980).
6. Myers, Weissman, Tischler, Holzer, Leaf, Orvaschel, Anthony, Boyd, Burke, Kramer
& Stoltzman, Six-Month Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders in Three Communities, 41
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 959, 966 (1984) (the study was a careful review of conditions in
three metropolitan areas).
7. Robins, Helzer, Weissman, Orvaschel, Gruenberg, Burke & Regier, Lifetime Preva-
lence of Specific Psychiatric Disorders in Three Sites, 41 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 949, 952
(1984). The two articles cited in notes 6 and 7 are part of an excellent and very large study of
the ,prevalence of psychiatric conditions, based on National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH) epidemiological catchment area programs. Several articles in 41 ARCHIVES OF GEN.
PSYCHIATRY No. 10 describe the study. See EPIDEMIOLOGIC FIELD METHODS IN PSYCHIA-
TRY: THE NIMH EPIDEMIOLOGIC CATCHMENT AREA PROGRAM (W. W. Eaton & L. Kessler
eds. 1985).
8. See supra notes 6 & 7. See generally Knesper, Belcher & Cross, Variations in the
Intensity of Psychiatric Treatment Across Markets for Mental Health Services in the United
States, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 797 (1988).
9. Flinn, McMahon & Collins, Health Maintenance Organizations and Their Implica-
tions for Psychiatry, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 255 (1987).
10. Califano, A Corporate Rx for America: Managing Runaway Health Care Costs, 2 Is-
SUES IN SCI. & TECH. 81 (1987). See Tsai, Bernacki & Reedy, Mental Health Care Utilization
and Costs in a Corporate Setting, 29 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 812 (1987).
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more than 10 percent of the federal government's budget went for two major
health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid."'
The Nature of Mental Health Services
The level and nature of mental health services has changed dramatically
since World War II. While there has been a significant increase in the
number of mental health care episodes, there also has been a substantial de-
crease in the percentage of mental health care episodes that involve mental
hospital admission. 2 These changes are demonstrated by the fact that in
1955, there were 1.7 million such episodes in the United States, with more
than 75 percent of these services being provided in inpatient facilities. By
1977, there were nearly 7 million patient care episodes of which only 27
percent were in psychiatric inpatient services.13 Even controlling for popu-
lation growth, the number of patient care episodes per 100,000 population
tripled during the period. These data do not include mental health care pro-
vided by partial care facilities such as halfway houses, private office practice,
and general hospital medical services, and, therefore, considerably under-
state the true rate of mental health care episodes. It appears that between 8
and 10 million people utilized mental health services in 1975, but it is esti-
mated that the unmet need for additional services included 11 to 16 million
people. '
The number of mental health care episodes in state mental hospitals de-
creased from 850,000 to 576,000 annually during this period.' 5 This decline
reflected the discovery of psychotropic drugs, restrictive involuntary civil
commitment statutes, improved psychological rehabilitation techniques, in-
creased use of community mental health services, and financial incentives to
transfer long-term mental patients to nursing homes.16 17 It also reflects the
fact that hospitalization for mental conditions has shifted from mental hospi-
tals to general hospitals. In 1965 there were 180,000 general hospital psychi-
atric inpatient episodes, while in 1979 there were approximately 1.2 million
11. Short & Goldfarb, Redistribution of Revenues Under a Prototypical Prospective Pay-
ment System: Characteristics of Winners and Losers, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 385
(1987).
12. A "mental health care episode" is an admission to an inpatient facility or presence on
the role of an outpatient facility.
13. M. WITKIN, TRENDS IN PATIENT CARE EPISODES IN MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES
1955-77 (National Institute of Mental Health Statistical Note 154, 1980).
14. Kiesler, National Health Insurance Testimony to the House of Representatives, in PsY-
CHOLOGY AND NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE: A SOURCEBOOK (C. Kiesler, N. Cummings
& G. VandenBos eds. 1980).
15. M. WITKIN, supra note 13.
16. Okin, State Hospitals in the 1980s, 33 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 717 (1982).
17. Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982).
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general hospital psychiatric admissions. Thus, the total number of mental
health related hospital episodes may have increased even though the number
of patients in mental hospitals has decreased. By one estimate, mental illness
still is responsible for nearly one quarter of the total hospital inpatient
days. '8
Between 1957 and 1976, there was a substantial increase in the number
and percentage of the population using professional mental health services; it
increased from 14 percent to 26 percent.' 9 Of course, the increase in the
demand for mental health services was reflected in the number of mental
health professionals, which increased more than fivefold between 1947 and
1977.20 During this thirty-year period, the number of psychologists and psy-
chiatrists increased tenfold.2 ' The costs of providing these mental health
services also grew to $20 billion by 1980.22 Ironically, the most seriously
disturbed were not receiving adequate service,23 and the real costs of mental
illness were estimated to be $73 billion, even excluding drug and alcohol
problems.24
Nearly 70 percent of the money spent on mental health care is for hospi-
talization. While 70 percent of mental health care costs are for inpatient
care, over 70 percent of the mental health care services are for outpatient
treatment.25 The federal government currently pays about 40 percent of
health care expenditures, the largest component of which is hospital reim-
bursement.26 Thus, the relatively high cost of inpatient care means that
there is a significant incentive to use outpatient mental health services as a
means of reducing total health care costs.
The level of underutilization of mental health services, or the size of the
unmet demand for those services, is most notable.27 It is apparent from the
18. C. KIESLER & A. SIBULKIN, MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION: MYTHS AND FACTS
ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS (1987).
19. Kulka, Veroff & Douvan, Social Class and the Use of Professional Help for Personal
Problems, 1957 and 1976, 20 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 2 (1979).
20. The increase was from 23,000 in 1947 to 121,000 in 1977. D. MECHANIC, MENTAL
HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (2d ed. 1980).
21. Cummings & Duhl, The New Delivery System, in THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES: COPING WITH CRISIS 85 (L. Cummings & N. Cummings eds. 1987).
22. Mechanic, Correcting Misconceptions in Mental Health Policy: Strategies for Improved
Care of the Seriously Mentally Ill, 65 MILBANK Q. 203 (1987).
23. Id; see generally F. CHU & S. TROTTER, THE MADNESS ESTABLISHMENT (1974).
24. H. HARWOOD, D. NAPOLITANO & P. KRISTIANSEN, ECONOMIC COSTS AND SOCIETY
OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1983).
25. Kiesler, Public and Professional Myths About Mental Hospitalization, 37 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 1323 (1982).
26. DeLeon & VandenBos, Psychotherapy Reimbursement in Federal Programs: Political
Factors, in PSYCHOTHERAPY: PRACTICE, RESEARCH, POLICY (G. VandenBos ed. 1980).
27. Goldman, Gattozzi & Taube, Defining and Counting the Chronically Mentally Ill, 32
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data reported above that only a relatively small proportion of the group
needing treatment in one year will actually receive mental health care.2"
THE BENEFITS OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE
Efficacy of Therapy
Early studies of the efficacy of psychotherapy suggested that therapy was
of little value.2 9 Later studies with improved research methodology utilizing
meta-analysis have demonstrated a general efficacy of psychotherapy.
Smith, Glass and Miller reviewed 475 studies involving controlled evalua-
tions of psychotherapy by considering "effect sizes" of psychotherapy.3"
They found that on average, a person after psychotherapy was better off than
80 percent of those who did not receive psychotherapy, while 9 percent of
those who received psychotherapy were worse off than those who did not
receive it. Their study was evaluated and amplified by Landman and Dawes,
who came to similar conclusions.3 1 The Office of Technology Assessment, a
scientific study arm of Congress, reviewed the literature on psychotherapy
outcomes. It also concluded that psychotherapy in general is effective. a2
Shapiro and Shapiro, using refined meta-analysis techniques devised by
Smith, Glass and Miller, concluded that in general there is moderate positive
effect found for psychotherapy.33
While evidence exists for the positive effects of psychotherapy generally,
the more difficult question is what forms of therapy are most effective. One
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 21 (1981); Test Effective Treatment of the Chronically
Mentally Ill: What Is Necessary?, 37 J. Soc. ISSUES 71 (1981). See Leaf, Factors Affecting the
Utilization of Specialty and General Mental Health Services, 26 MED. CARE 9 (1988).
28. See supra notes 5 - 7 & 19 - 24.
29. Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy: An Evaluation, 16 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL-
oGY 319 (1952). See H. Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy (1966); May, For Better or For
Worse? Psychotherapy and Variance Change: A Critical Review of the Literature, 152 J. NER-
VOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 184 (1971).
30. M. SMITH, G. GLASS & T. MILLER, THE BENEFITS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980). Ef-
fect size is the mean difference between treated and control groups, divided by the standard
deviation of the control group. Effect size is thus a standardized mean difference that can be
used to compare several different rating systems, instruments and therapies. It is therefore
useful in reviewing a large number of studies of the consequences of therapy.
31. Landman & Dawes, Psychotherapy Outcomes: Smith and Glass' Conclusions Stand Up
Under Scrutiny, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 504 (1982). See also Howard, Kopta, Krause & Orlin-
sky, The Dose Effect Relationship in Psychotherapy, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 159 (1986) (50
percent of the patients of psychotherapy were improved measurably by the eighth session, 75
percent by the 26th session; there was not much of an increase beyond that).
32. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE EFFICACY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS
OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1980).
33. Shapiro & Shapiro, Meta-Analysis of Psychotherapy Outcome Studies: A Replication
and Refinement, 92 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 581 (1982).
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author counted 160 "brand names" of psychotherapy34 and, as the Office of
Technology Assessment noted, it is critical to know which types of psycho-
therapy in each setting are best for a patient. However, existing data do not,
in most cases, answer these questions.35 Although Shapiro and Shapiro
found a modest superiority of cognitive and behavioral methods of psycho-
therapy and modest inferiority of psychodynamic and humanistic thera-
pies, 36 these findings have been criticized. 37 While there has been some
suggestion that for even severely disturbed patients intensive outpatient care
is more effective than intensive inpatient care,3 1 it is generally concluded that
"the present evidence does not permit the identification of any procedures or
techniques that are clearly ineffective or unsafe or that any are clearly more
effective than others.",
39
In addition to the issue of the efficacy of various kinds of therapy, the
question of comparative cost-effectiveness arises.' That is, determining how
effective various therapies are per dollar cost of providing them. Several
studies indicate that for most patients, mental hospitalization is less cost-
effective than outpatient therapy. 41 The difficulty in establishing clear differ-
ences in the effects of different kinds of therapy makes it impossible to do a
detailed cost-effectiveness analysis. The absence of these kinds of data is
probably a major factor in the reluctance of government and private insurers
to expand mental health care coverage. Because the most effective therapy
may depend on the mental condition, age and status, feelings about therapy,
and so on, a complicated series of studies will be necessary to determine
which therapies are effective in what circumstances.
34. Parloff, Psychotherapy Research Evidence and Reimbursement Decisions: Bambi
Meets Godzilla, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 718 (1982).
35. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 32; Banta & Saxe, Reimbursement
for Psychotherapy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 919 (1983).
36. M. SMITH, G. GLASS & T. MILLER, supra note 30, at 18.
37. McGuire & Frisman, Reimbursement Policy and Cost-Effective Mental Health Care,
38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 935 (1983).
38. Binner, Halpin & Potter, Patients, Programs and Results in a Comprehensive Mental
Health Center, 41 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 148 (1973); Cassell, Smith,
Gruenberg, Boan & Thomas, Comparing Costs of Hospital and Community Care, 23 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 197 (1972).
39. Parloff, supra note 34.
40. See T. McGUIRE, FINANCING PSYCHOTHERAPY: COSTS, EFFECTS AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY (1981).
41. Kiesler, Mental Hospitals and Alternative Care, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 349 (1982)
(reviewing 10 studies where patients were assigned either to inpatient or to outpatient care; the
outpatient care was consistently more positive than inpatient care). See also supra note 38.
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Mental Health Coverage and Health Care Savings
An important question in assessing the cost effectiveness of mental health
care is the effect that the mental health care coverage has on total health care
cost. Reductions are likely in total costs if patients can be diverted from
expensive hospitalization to less expensive outpatient care. One study found
that the cost of comprehensive mental health care benefits was less expensive
than selected mental health benefits.42 One reason for this may be that com-
prehensive coverage encourages outpatient care, while selected coverage en-
courages inpatient care. It is also possible that comprehensive services
encourage early (and less expensive) treatment.
Providing mental health services may lower total health care spending by
reducing the use of physical health care services. There is considerable evi-
dence that emotional factors may cause or aggravate physical disorders.
From 6 percent to 86 percent of patients in general medical settings have
been found to have psychological disorders.4 3 Perhaps half of the patients
with psychological disorders are seen by nonpsychiatric physicians.' For
patients with health problems, providing mental health services can signifi-
cantly reduce total medical services costs.
45
One problem with providing mental health services as part of general
health insurance has been that the use of these mental health services often
increases significantly. For example, when Chrysler increased employee
mental health coverage, the use of these services increased more than 600
42. Cohen & Hunter, Mental Health Insurance: A Comparison of a Fee-for-Service In-
demnity Plan and a Comprehensive Mental Health Center, 42 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 146
(1972). Selective mental health benefits cost $13.80 per member, comprehensive benefits cost
$3.88. If outpatient service results in even a minor reduction in inpatient services, the cost
savings can be quite substantial. Therefore, even though increased mental health services were
provided under the comprehensive plan, the total cost was lower because of the reduction in
inpatient services. For a review of studies regarding psychotherapy and medical care utiliza-
tion, see Jones & Vischi, Impact of Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Treatment on
Medical Care Utilization: A Review of the Research Literature, 17 MED. CARE 1 (1979).
43. Schlesinger, Mumford & Glass, Mental Health Services and Medical Utilization, in
PSYCHOTHERAPY: PRACTICE, RESEARCH, POLICY 96 (G. VandenBos ed. 1980). One implica-
tion of the Schlesinger study is that general health care costs may be increased if mental health
services are not provided to those who need them.
44. Regeir, The Nature and Scope of Mental Health Problems, in 1 PRIMARY CARE: VA-
RIABILITY AND METHODOLOGY IN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN GENERAL HEALTH
CARE (Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences 1979); Yates, How Psychology
Can Improve Effectiveness and Reduce Costs of Health Service, 21 PSYCHOTHERAPY 439
(1984).
45. Yates, supra note 44. See Holder & Blose, Changes in Health Care Costs and Utiliza-
tion Associated with Mental Health Treatment, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1070
(1987).
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percent.46 However, even though covering mental health services increases
the resources devoted to these services, the mental health costs are offset by a
reduction in general medical utilization. Furthermore, mental health serv-
ices may significantly reduce other costs (absenteeism and antisocial behav-
ior) that are real industrial or social costs, but are not reflected in health care
costs.
4 7
There is evidence that medical services utilization may be reduced for vir-
tually all mental health diagnostic groups by providing psychotherapy.48
The level of this reduction can be significant, perhaps ranging from 25 per-
cent to 60 percent reduction in general medical utilization when general
mental health care benefits are available.49 These data may be considered
tentative, but they do suggest the very real possibility that increasing mental
health services may reduce total health care costs. Additional studies con-
cerning the effect of mental health services on total health care costs are
continuing. If the data reported above are confirmed, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that mental health care services could be expanded as a way of reducing
total health care costs.
Thus, while it is not yet possible to compare the efficacy or cost effective-
ness of various kinds of mental health services, there is significant evidence
for the following propositions:
1. In general, mental health care is effective in promoting change or im-
proving the mental condition of patients ("curing") faster than without
treatment.
2. Provision of comprehensive mental health services may be less expen-
sive than providing selective (inpatient) mental health services only.
46. Califano, Califano Speaks on Health Care Costs at Gracie Square Celebration, Psychi-
atric News, Aug. 3, 1984, at 14, quoted in Kiesler & Morton, Psychology and Public Policy in
the "Health Care Revolution," 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 993, 998 (1988).
47. Kiesler & Morton, supra note 46.
48. Rosen & Wiens, Changes in Medical Problems and Use of Medical Services Following
Psychological Intervention, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 420 (1979). See infra note 49.
49. Schlesinger, Mumford and Glass considered 11 studies involving the use of medical
utilization by those receiving psychotherapy. They found that following psychotherapy, pa-
tient medical utilization dropped approximately 25 percent. Schlesinger, Mumford & Glass,
Mental Health Services and Medical Utilization, in PSYCHOTHERAPY: PRACTICE, RESEARCH,
POLICY (G. VandenBos ed. 1980). Cummings found that the availability of mental health
services reduced general medical utilization for patients by up to 60 percent. Cummings, The
Anatomy of Psychotherapy Under National Health Insurance, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 711
(1977). For a review of a number of studies suggesting that mental health services may reduce
total medical care usage for a number of conditions, see D. UPTON, MENTAL HEALTH CARE
AND NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 113-27 (1983); Mumford, Schlesinger, Glass, Patrick &
Cuerdon, A New Look at Evidence About Reduced Cost of Medical Utilization Following
Mental Health Treatment, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1145 (1984).
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3. Providing effective mental health services reduces the demand for
physical health care and thereby may reduce total health care costs.
Given these propositions it is somewhat surprising that coverage for
mental services has been so limited. The explanation may lie in the histori-
cal development of private and governmental health care coverage, with its
emphasis on hospital care. It may relate to the absence (until recently) of
incentives to cut costs and provide efficient services, and it may relate to the
fact that only recently have dependable data concerning the benefits of
mental health care coverage been available. To the extent that new systems
of physical care put an emphasis on keeping patients out of the hospital and
reducing total health care costs, coverage for outpatient mental health care
may become increasingly important.
PROVIDING MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
As noted, estimates are that at any time at least 15 percent to 20 percent
of the population is in need of mental health services, and that a third of the
population has experienced a mental disorder during their lives.50 Despite
this broad need, or perhaps in part because of it, the provision of mental
health services has been very limited both in terms of reimbursement for
service and in terms of the variety of professionals whose services are cov-
ered for reimbursement. This Article now briefly considers the coverage of
mental health services by private insurers and the government, and the limi-
tations on the mental health professional whose services will be covered by
insurance or government programs.
Insurance and Mental Health Services
Following World War II there was dramatic growth in the health insur-
ance industry. Private health insurance became a standard employment
fringe benefit."1 Although the tendency until the early 1980s was to expand
coverage, mental health coverage still lagged behind physical health insur-
ance, with severe limits on coverage for inpatient days and even more limits
on outpatient services.52 By the 1980s, some benefit programs had substan-
50. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
51. See Banta & Saxe, Reimbursement for Psychotherapy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 919
(1983); Ruby, The Policy Implications of Insurance Coverage for Psychiatric Services, 7 INT'L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY 269 (1984).
52. See R. H. FELIX, MENTAL ILLNESS-PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS (1967); P. MARGO,
R. GRIPP & D. McDOWELL, THE MENTAL HEALTH INDUSTRY: A CULTURAL PHENOME-
NON (1978); T. McGUIRE, FINANCING PSYCHOTHERAPY: COSTS, EFFECTS AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY (1981). Regarding alternative financing for certain types of care, see Harris & Bergman,
Capitation Financingfor the Chronic Mentally Ill: A Case Management Approach, 39 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 68 (1988).
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tially reduced previous coverage gains.53 When health maintenance organi-
zations (HMOs) were recognized and protected by Congress, they were
required to provide comprehensive health care, with the exception that they
could limit inpatient and outpatient services for mental health care.54
The reasons for this limitation on benefits may have to do with the diffi-
culty in determining when mental health services are really necessary or
when a patient is malingering or a mental health professional is providing
unnecessary services. Mental health injuries may seem less real than observ-
able physical injuries. Much mental health treatment is seen as general im-
provement or growth-oriented rather than curing a disease, and in that sense
appears to be elective or even cosmetic. Some forms of therapy, for example,
traditional psychoanalysis, are very extended and quite expensive. Psycho-
therapy is criticized as being "insubstantial care for self-defined illnesses
with no clear indication of starting or finishing and no way to judge effective-
ness-whether there are results worth paying for." " These attitudes may
explain why insurance companies and employers who purchase health insur-
ance for their employees may not see mental health coverage as important or
attractive.
56
Despite setbacks in other areas, in some areas coverage for mental illness
may be increasing a bit as a result of state legislative action and the changing
nature of health care. A number of states have now passed mental health
"parity" statutes.57 These laws require that insurance carriers within the
state provide mental health coverage on the same basis or to the same extent
as physical coverage. The purpose of these statutes is to prevent unfair dis-
crimination against those with mental illness. The Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of such statutes, and their popularity seems to be
growing. 
a
53. The federal government, for example, in 1981 began cutting mental health benefits in
its Federal Employees Health Benefits Program through Blue Cross and Blue Shield. Outpa-
tient visits were limited to 50 annually, inpatient days were limited to 60 and co-payments
were raised from 20 percent to 30 percent. Regarding the general reduction in mental health
benefits, see Rinella, Ethical Issues and Psychiatric Cost-Containment Strategies, 9 INT'L J. L.
& PSYCHIATRY, 125, 126-131 (1986).
54. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222 (1973). See Blon-
stin & Marclay, HMOs and Other Employee Health Plans: Coverage and Employee Premiums,
6 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 28 (1983).
55. McGuire, Markets for Psychotherapy, in PSYCHOTHERAPY: PRACTICE, RESEARCH,
POLICY 76 (G. R. VandenBos ed. 1980).
56. For some other perspectives on the causes of inadequate mental health care, see F.
CHU & S. TROTTER, supra note 23; ISSUES IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH CARE
(J. McKinlay ed. 1985).
57. McGuire & Montgomery, Mandated Mental Health Benefits in Private Health Insur-
ance, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 380 (1982).
58. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 41 U.S. 724 (1985). Heitler, Man-
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As we shall see, several changes in delivery of health services, such as the
emphasis on coverage of all medical care and not just hospital based services
(e.g., HMOs), may ultimately encourage greater coverage of some outpatient
mental health services.59 If they can reduce the incidence of physical health
problems or hospitalization, then there will be a strong economic incentive
to provide them.
State and Local Government Programs
Governments have long accepted some responsibility for dealing with and
caring for the mentally ill.6" It has traditionally fallen to state and local
governments to offer mental health facilities through asylums, the involun-
tary civil commitment process and indigent care programs for some patients
unable to pay.6'
States generally fund a wide variety of mental health programs. The de-
velopment of private insurance and the reduction in the number and size of
state mental hospitals have reduced the relative importance of state serv-
ices.6 2 Further, while state and local governments maintain a major respon-
sibility for providing mental health care to the indigent, since the 1960s the
federal government has taken an increasingly larger role. 63 The federal pro-
gram coverage for mental health services is now a major factor in determin-
ing the extent of mental health care available.
64
The Federal Government
The major federal involvement in efforts to provide mental health services
came after World War II. During the war nearly 1.9 million men were re-
dated Benefits: Their Social, Economic, and Legal Implications, I 1 L., MED. & HEALTH CARE
248 (1983).
59. Flinn, McMahon & Collins, Health Maintenance Organizations and Their Implica-
tions for Psychiatry, 38 Hose. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 255 (1987); Marshall, HMOs and
Psychiatry: Could There Be a Silver Lining?, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 35 (1987).
60. M. LEVINE, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH (1981);
D. MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969).
61. A state may present significant legal and ethical problems when it provides mental
health care. These problems have been especially difficult when the state imposes involuntary
services, as in involuntary civil commitment or forced psychiatric treatment. See S. SMITH &
R. MEYER, LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND MENTAL HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1987); Daly,
The Diverse Goals Involved in Treatment of the Mentally II: Is a Collision Inevitable?, 8 J.
LEGAL MED. 49 (1987).
62. See supra note 15 (changes in the state mental health hospitals). One reason the state
responsibility for mental health services decreased was the outrageous conditions that existed
in state mental facilities. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
63. Grob, The Forging of Mental Health Policy in America: World War II to New Fron-
tier, 42 J. HISTORY MED. & ALLIED ScI. 410 (1987).
64. T. BUTLER, MENTAL HEALTH, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE LAW (1985).
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jected for military service because of mental problems.65 In addition de-
scriptions of state mental hospitals as snake pits, "human warehouses;" and
"houses of horror" 66 attracted considerable national attention. One account
stated that these hospitals rivaled "the horror of the Nazi concentration
camps - hundreds of naked mental patients herded into huge, barn-like, filth-
infested wards, in all degrees of deterioration. "67
The National Mental Health Act of 1946 was passed to encourage re-
search and investigation relating to the causes, diagnosis, and treatment of
psychiatric disorders through the National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH).68 In 1955 Congress established the Joint Commission of Mental
Health and Illness, which reported its findings in 1961.69 It noted the need
for massive expenditures in the mental health field and argued for compre-
hensive care centers. President Kennedy, responding to the report, urged a
"bold new approach" in the federal response to national mental health
problems: reducing the number of institutionalized patients by 50 percent
within ten years and replacing large mental hospitals with comprehensive
community mental health centers.
The Community Mental Health Center Act of 1963 provided money to
construct comprehensive mental health centers, later to be funded through
the states.70 Each community mental health center was to include inpatient,
outpatient, and partial hospitalization services; 24-hour emergency services;
and consultation and education services. To the extent possible they were
also to engage in a broad range of diagnostic services, rehabilitation services,
precare and after care services, and education and research. It was hoped
that these centers would provide equal access to quality services for the rich
and poor alike.71
By 1970, 450 community mental health services were in operation, but the
growth was reduced as federal funding slowed somewhat and states demon-
strated a reluctance to fund the centers as planned. The centers, as well as
the development of psychoactive drugs and an emphasis on deinstitutional-
ization, resulted in dramatic reduction in the number of patients in mental
65. D. MECHANIC, supra note 60.
66. F.D. CHU & S. TROTTER, supra note 23.
67. A. DEUTSCH, SHAME OF THE STATE (1948).
68. Pub. L. No. 79-487 (1946).
69. The Commission was established through the Mental Health Study Act of 1955. The
Commission's report was entitled Action for Mental Health.
70. Pub. L. No. 88-164 (1963). In the act, Congress envisioned the establishment of local
or community "catchment areas" of between 75,000 and 200,000 persons.
71. See H. FOLEY & S. SHARFSTEIN, MADNESS AND GOVERNMENT: WHO CARES FOR
THE MENTALLY ILL? (1983).
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institutions.7 2 Unfortunately, the release of patients from mental institutions
was not accompanied by a sufficient increase in community-based treatment
facilities, housing, training, and educational and recreational programs.7 3
As a result, deinstitutionalization too often was "a shift of patients from
back wards to back alleys."
74
In the late 1970s another presidential commission recommended a
number of new service initiatives to provide mental health treatment for any-
one who needed it regardless of income.75 The commission's report essen-
tially viewed mental health services as a right with a corresponding public
responsibility for financing the services. The Mental Health Systems Act of
1980 was arguably the most comprehensive mental health legislation ever
passed in the United States. 76 It coordinated a variety of mental health serv-
ices and continued emphasis on community mental health centers. Special
programs were provided for chronically mentally ill, children and adoles-
cents, the elderly, minorities, and rape victims. Before much of this act
could be implemented, its sponsor, President Carter, was replaced by Presi-
dent Reagan, and much of the act was repealed. Funds were cut for services
and in place of some specific programs, states were given "block grants"
covering broad ranges of health services and mental health programs.7 7
The major health care programs of the federal government are Medicare
and Medicaid. There are also a variety of specific health service programs
directed in part toward mental health care. Medicare is part of the Social
Security program that provides health care services for elderly and for the
disabled. Funding for mental health services under Medicare has been ex-
tremely limited, and it traditionally has been resistant to expanding mental
72. M. LEVINE, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH (1981).
73. See P. SOLOMON, B. GORDON & J. DAVIS, COMMUNITY SERVICES TO DISCHARGED
PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS (1984)..
74. Borus, Issues Critical to the Survival of Community Mental Health, 135 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 1029 (1978).
75. President Carter appointed the President's Commission of Mental Health shortly after
assuming office in 1977. Mrs. Carter was the honorary chairperson of the commission. It
recommended a number of new service initiatives and sought to correct the imbalance between
physical and mental health expenditures and services. It also supported reimbursement for
mental health services provided by nonmedical professionals. It recommended the establish-
ment of the Mental Patient's Bill of Rights (perhaps its most enduring contribution).
76. Pub. L. No. 96-398 (1980).
77. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35 (1981). For a discussion of
the problems with the mental health system, see Talbott, The Fate of the Public Psychiatric
System, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 46 (1985). More recently, the Protection and
Advocacy for Mentally Ill People Act of 1986 was enacted. It provides limited funds for states
to provide advocacy services for people with mental illness and emotional disorders. Among
other things, the advocacy is intended to protect these patients from neglect and abuse and to
assist them in obtaining benefits. Pub. L. No. 99-319 (1986).
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health coverage. In this sense it has followed private health insurance.
Although the mental health benefits were expanded by Congress in Decem-
ber 1986, when it authorized direct payment to psychologists through com-
munity mental health centers and rural health clinics, there has been little
inclination to expand to full mental health coverage. 7 8
The traditional means of reimbursement for Medicare hospital expenses
(the major portion of the program) has been on a "cost plus" basis so that in
effect hospitals were paid on the basis of treatment costs. There was thus
little incentive for hospitals and physicians to reduce costs. Medicare has
moved toward a "prospective payment system" under which hospitals are
reimbursed at a predetermined rate based on the condition or diagnosis of
the patient. Medical conditions are placed in diagnostic related groupings
(DRGs), and hospitals are paid a flat rate for each admission based on the
DRG as adjusted to take limited account of geographical factors. 79 Hospi-
tals receive the same amount for the admission regardless of the actual
length of hospital stay or the efficiency or inefficiency of the hospital8 0 The
DRG system imposes strong economic incentives for hospitals to operate
efficiently and to keep Medicare patient stays as short as possible.81
Because of the complexity of psychiatric diagnoses and conditions, DRGs
covering psychiatric care in this area have been delayed. Mental health pro-
fessionals have thus far argued successfully that DRGs should not be applied
because the length of mental patient hospital stays is too variable to fit
within the DRG system.82 Initial data supported this contention,83 although
later studies seem to suggest that DRGs could be applied to mental patient
78. DeLeon & VandenBos, Psychotherapy Reimbursement in Federal Programs: Political
Factors, in PSYCHOTHERAPY: PRACTICE, RESEARCH, POLICY (G. R. VandenBos ed. 1980);
Ruby, The Policy Implications of Insurance Coverage for Psychiatric Services, 7 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 269 (1984).
79. See Thienhaus & Simon, Prospective Payment and Hospital Psychiatry, 83 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1041 (1987).
80. Uyeda & Moldawsky, Prospective Payment and Psychological Services, 41 AM. PsY-
CHOLOGIST 60 (1986).
81. Federal programs and private insurers have also endeavored to cut costs by imposing
treatment reviews, for example, to avoid unnecessary hospitalization. For example, prior or
concurrent review by quality assurance authorities have been used along with "retrospective"
reviews to avoid overtreatment. Such programs also monitor the quality of care. G. TIs-
CHLER & B. ASTRACHAN, QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MENTAL HEALTH: PEER AND UTILIZA-
TION REVIEW (1982). Such programs can raise conflicts between therapists' obligations to
their patients and the efforts to cut costs. Rinella, Ethical Issues and Psychiatric Cost-Contain-
ment Strategies, 9 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 125 (1986).
82. Kiesler & Morton, supra note 46; Schumacher, Namerow, Parker, Fox & Kofle, Pro-
spective Payment for Psychiatry--Feasibility and Impact, 315 N. ENG. J. MED. 1331 (1986).
83. English, Sharfstein, Scherl, Astranchan & Muszynski, Diagnosis-Related Groups and
General Hospital Psychiatry: The APA Study, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 131 (1986).
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hospital stays.84 In the long run, arguments that DRGs should not be ap-
plied to mental health conditions may have the unfortunate consequence of
reinforcing the feeling that mental health services are unpredictable and not
scientific.
The use of DRGs may influence mental health care in a number of subtle
ways. 5 It will encourage hospitals to discharge mental patients as quickly
as possible, perhaps thereby promoting deinstitutionalization. In the long
run it may also encourage the use of mental health professionals if providing
mental health services to those hospitalized for physical ailments promotes
early release from the hospital. The incentive toward efficiency also may
encourage hospitals to use lower priced professionals (e.g., social workers, or
paraprofessionals), instead of higher priced professionals (e.g., psychiatrists)
to perform some services. The long-term effects of the prospective payment
system and the use of DRG cannot yet be fully calculated. 6
Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state effort to provide medical services
for the indigent. 7 The federal government provides substantial funding and
general regulations under which states operate their Medicaid programs.
States have some latitude under Medicaid to decide who and what condi-
tions will be covered to provide for the health care costs for the poor. The
federal funding for mental health care is extremely limited under Medicaid.
For example, it does not cover services to patients under 65 in an "institu-
tion for mental diseases." s88 Most states provide few Medicaid mental health
services. Because states are permitted to define their programs within fed-
eral guidelines, the programs vary somewhat from one state to another. 9
84. Kiesler, Simpkins & Morton, Predicting Hospital Length of Stay for Psychiatric Inpa-
tients: The HDS Data, (unpublished technical report) quoted in Kiesler & Morton, supra note
46. For a good review of the issues regarding the use of DRGs in mental health care, see
Kiesler & Morton, Prospective Payment System for Psychiatric Services: The Advantages of
Controversy, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 141 (1988).
85. Appelbaum, DRGs and Mental Health Law: A Glimpse of the Future, 37 Hose. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 997 (1986).
86. See Binner, DRGs and the Administration of Mental Health Services, 41 AM. PSy-
CHOLOGIST 64 (1986); Taube, Lee & Forthofer, DRGs in Psychiatry: An Empirical Evaluation,
22 MED. CARE 597 (1984). See also Goldman, Pincus, Taub & Reiger, Prospective Payment
for Psychiatric Hospitalization: Questions and Issues, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
460 (1984).
87. The legislative purpose of Medicaid is to "enable each State ... to furnish medical
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or permanently
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services and rehabilitation .. " 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
88. The Supreme Court has refused to prohibit this practice. For a discussion of the
issues, see Connecticut v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985).
89. Somewhat related to Medicaid is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program of
Social Security. It provides a subsistence allowance to the disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982).
Inmates of public institutions do not generally receive SSI payments. When combined with
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Budget cuts and reallocations have had the effect of reducing some support
for Medicare, Medicaid, and related Social Security programs.90
Many view 1978 to 1980 as the high water mark of federal involvement
with and concern for funding for mental health services. However, the pro-
cess of deinstitutionalization was never accompanied by the planned com-
munity facilities nor were the promises fulfilled of providing mental health
services to all Americans who needed them.91
Federal mental health interest has had an element of faddishness. 92 There
has been funding for problems of immediate public interest which subsides
to be replaced by a new "in" problem, among them child and adolescent
care, rape victim counseling, family violence, alcohol and drug dependence,
and post-traumatic stress syndrome. Federal mental health services funding
has not been consistent or pursued with any form of long-term planning or
commitment. 93
Mental Health Services and Professional Status
When mental health services are covered by government programs or pri-
vate insurance, the question often remains: which professionals may provide
services and be reimbursed for them? In the past, most private insurance
provided for billing by or through a psychiatrist.9a The major medical insur-
ance company (Blue Cross & Blue Shield) strongly favored psychiatrists,
perhaps because the.company was closely tied to physicians. This process
probably tended to increase prices, and decreased the availability of services
of psychologists and other independent providers.
Several factors are tending to increase the ability of nonpsychiatric mental
health professionals to participate in reimbursement plans. Some states have
very limited mental health coverage under Medicaid and Medicare, these limitations for inpa-
tient mentally ill can be severe. This practice was challenged but upheld by the Supreme Court
in Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
90. The future direction of funding for mental health care related programs is difficult to
predict. In general these federal programs have strong political support, but concerns about
cost increases may result in increasing resistance to tax increases to pay for the improved
services.
91. A number of underserved groups have been identified. E.g., Chiles, Federal Involve-
ment in Mental Retardation Programs, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 792 (1987); Roybal, Mental
Health and Aging: The Need for an Expanded Federal Response, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 189
(1988). See F. CHU & S. TROTTER, supra note 23; H. FOLEY & S. SHARFSTEIN, supra note 71;
Jansen, Mental Health Policy: Observation from Europe, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1273 (1986).
92. T. BUTLER, supra note 64; Rochefort, The Political Context of Mental Health Care, 36
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 93 (1987).
93. T. BUTLER, supra note 64.
94. Dorken & Webb, Third-Party Reimbursement Experience: An Interstate Comparison
by Insurance Carrier, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 355 (1980).
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passed "freedom of choice" legislation which gives consumers the right to
choose from a range of mental health professionals which can be reimbursed
by insurance.95 The threat of antitrust action against reimbursement-only-
through-psychiatrist provisions has reduced the number of such provisions
in insurance contracts. 96 In addition, a number of new economic considera-
tions provide incentives to use the least costly effective therapy. For exam-
ple, HMOs, preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and DRGs should
encourage the use of psychologists, social workers, and other independently
licensed professionals. In HMOs, for example, payment is based on a flat fee
for providing all health needs rather than on a straight fee-for-service basis.
Therefore, the incentives are to provide effective treatment at the lowest cost
possible and this may encourage the use of nonphysician mental health prov-
iders whose fees tend to be lower than psychiatrists.97
In addition, new trends in health care are tending to deemphasize in-hos-
pital, physician-oriented treatment (which is, of course, the most expensive
form of health care) and emphasize services performed, often by nonphysi-
cians, on an outpatient basis. On the other hand, these trends may harm
nonpsychiatrist mental health providers, because physicians may increas-
ingly serve as gatekeepers to more and more mental health care.98 For ex-
ample, PPOs may require referral through a primary physician and thereby
limit the roles of others. If all health care must be initiated through an or-
ganization (PPO or HMO) to which only physicians have access, then
mental health care could increasingly be initiated through physician contact
and with some physician supervision. It is too early to determine what the
ultimate role of these new forms will be, let alone what effect they will have
on the provision of mental health care services.99
95. Cummings, Mental Health and National Health Insurance: A Case History of the
Struggle for Professional Autonomy, in PSYCHOLOGY AND NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
A SOURCEBOOK (C. Kiesler, N. Cummings & G. VandenBos eds. 1980); Tenney, Hospital
Privileges for Psychologists, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1232 (1983).
96. E.g., Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982); Virginia Academy of
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), on remand, 501 F.
Supp. 1232 (E.D. Va. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). The antitrust aspects of these
new forms of delivery are considered in K. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 171-
95 (2d ed. 1985); Batavia, Preferred Provider Organizations: Antitrust Aspects and Implications
for the Hospital Industry, 10 AM. J. L. & MED. 169 (1984); Schmidt, Health Maintenance
Organizations and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 437 (1984).
97. Wiggins, The Psychologist as a Health Professional in the Health Maintenance Organi-
zation, 7 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRAC. 9 (1976).
98. Turkington, Preferred Providers Please and Puzzle Private Practitioners, APA Monitor
Feb. 1984, at 18. See Brady & Krizay, Utilization and Coverage of Mental Health Services in
Health Maintenance Organizations, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 744 (1985); Cheifetz & Salloway,
Patterns of Mental Health Services Provided by HMOs, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 495 (1984).
99. Sank & Shapiro, Case Examples of the Broadening Role of Psychology in Health Main-
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LICENSING
Licensing is the most elementary form of direct control of mental health
delivery. It establishes who will be permitted to deliver certain services, and
who will not.1 °° Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote that "if the whole
materia medica ... could be sunk to the bottom of the sea, it would be all
the better for mankind-and all the worse for the fishes," '  a claim also
made for the licensing of mental health practitioners. 0 2
Purpose of Licensure
Licensing is intended primarily to protect the public from inadequate or
dangerous practitioners. Licensing also serves to protect the licensed profes-
sion from certain kinds of competition and promotes its respectability; 0 3 it
is a formal recognition of the legitimacy and value of the profession;" and
it is a step along the route of being included both in a testimonial privilege
(which is usually associated with licensed professions)"0 5 and in third-party
reimbursement plans. Licensing is double-edged: it may promote the public
interest by improving the quality of care, but it may threaten it because entry
into the profession is restricted, so that availability of services is reduced and
prices are increased.' 6 Whether licensing actually serves the public interest,
tenance Organizations, 10 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRAC. 402 (1979) (found very
few staff positions for psychologists and fewer still in leadership roles).
100. Christman, Who Can Do Therapy?, in THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES:
COPING WITH CRISIS (L. Duhl & N. Cummings eds. 1986).
101. OW. HOLMES, SR., MEDICAL ESSAYS 203 (1892).
102. In fact, one critic of licensing quotes Holmes as part of his argument that professional
entry requirements are arbitrary and harmful. D. HOGAN, THE REGULATION OF PSYCHO-
THERAPISTS 252 (1979). The four volumes by Hogan on the regulation of psychotherapy is an
extraordinarily complete and very useful review of licensure laws affecting psychotherapy.
Although somewhat dated, volume 2 of the work, subtitled A Handbook of State Licensure
Laws, provides a state-by-state and profession-by-profession summary of licensing regulation.
103. C. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT (1966);
Gross, The Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (1978); Wallace, Oc-
cupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46
(1972).
104. Ideally, a profession is guided by a high sense of social responsibility. In return for a
high level of self-regulation granted by society, the professions should ensure that only reason-
ably competent and ethical practitioners are permitted to practice, that monopoly-type profits
are avoided, that the profession renders service only within its area of expertise, and that it
does not restrict licensing for the purpose of promoting its own economic interests. See San-
ford, Annual Report of the Executive Secretary, 6 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 668 (1951).
105. Smith, Constitutional Privacy and Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1980);
Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality On Giving With One Hand
and Removing With the Other, 75 KY. L. J. 473 (1987).
106. S. GROSS, OF FOXES AND HENHOUSES: LICENSING AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS
(1984).
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and if so, what form of licensing best serves it, thus continue to be important
questions. 107 It is possible that the trend toward increased licensing will be
reversed and that "deregulation" could even result in the abandonment of
some current licensing statutes. 10
8
A philosophical question of autonomy and public protection also exists.
On one hand some argue that individuals should be free to seek services
from anyone of their choosing, whether or not the professional is approved
by the state; the individual takes the risk (if there is one) of being harmed by
an incompetent and the risk of not finding out enough about the professional
to determine competency. Others argue that it is often unrealistic for a lay
person to judge the competence of professionals and that society has a public
safety interest in ensuring that those seeking mental health services receive
competent treatment. This debate is one of perception (how dangerous an
incompetent practitioner is) and one of values (how much the government
should intervene to protect us from a very bad choice of practitioners).
State licensing activities take several forms. It may prohibit certain kinds
of practice without a license (e.g., using ECT or prescribing drugs). It may
also limit the use of certain titles such as "psychologist" or "M.D." or "mar-
riage counselor." Or the state may require registration in order to keep track
of who is engaged in practice. It is common for a state that limits practice to
licensees to also limit the use of the title associated with that profession.
There is no consistent name for these three forms of regulation. 09 To avoid
confusion, in this Article: "practice" laws or statutes refer to limitation on
practice; "title" laws refer to limitations on the use of title; and "registra-
tion" laws to refer to the requirement for registration with the state. "Li-
censing" generally refers to the first two kinds of regulation.
The purpose served by each of these forms of regulation differs. "Prac-
tice" acts are intended to completely prohibit the incompetent from provid-
ing services. The theory is that the possibility of harm to the public is so
great that it is necessary to prohibit them from practicing. Title laws are
107. For a history of the regulation of the mental health professions, see THE HISTORY OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY: FROM HEALING MAGIC TO ENCOUNTER (J. Ehrenwald ed. 1976); H.
KENDLER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY (1987); Danish, Considering Professional Licensing
from a Social and Historical Context, 9 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 35 (1980); Note, Regula-
tion of Psychological Counseling and Psychotherapy, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 474 (1951).
108. In a few instances licensing statutes have been repealed or allowed to expire. See B.
FRETZ & D. MILLS, LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND COUNSELORS
(1980); Hale, The Illusion of Effective Regulation, 35 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 10 (1981);
Jackson & Branum, Licensing is Lovelier the Second Time Around, 2 PROF. PRAC. PSYCHOL-
OGY 35 (1981).
109. See R.L. SCHWITZGEBEL & R. K. SCHWITZGEBEL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PRACTICE 222 (1980). In Kentucky, on the other hand, the state licensure board for a number
of years recognized master's-level psychologists as certificants.
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intended to provide information in that, by reserving certain titles or labels
to those with minimal levels of competence and credentials, people can as-
certain whether a practitioner has at least that level of quality. Although
registration laws provide no direct consumer service, they do provide a
method of monitoring practitioners.
Professional Differences
Mental health professions have approached licensing in various ways. In-
terestingly, there is virtually no licensing in psychiatry (beyond the M.D.
requirement) and psychiatrists as a group have not sought licensing author-
ity. (Licensing must be clearly distinguished from board certification, which
is voluntary and not required to practice a specialty or to use a specialty
title.) Any physician may claim to be a psychiatrist, without special training
or testing. In fact, it appears that less than half of those specializing in psy-
chiatry have obtained certification."' The reasons for this are not entirely
clear. It is perhaps related to the development of psychiatry within
medicine. The medical profession has its own licensing system and a history
of specialty practice without specialty licensing. It may also be that there
has been little need for physician/psychiatrists to depend upon specialty li-
censing for recognition and third-party reimbursement.
Psychologists, on the other hand, have actively and successfully sought
licensure. Social workers, marriage and family therapists, and counselors
have more recently sought licensure statutes."l' Some states have licensed a
wide variety of other mental health professions, including psychiatric techni-
cian nurse (Arkansas), psychiatric technicians (e.g., California and Colo-
rado), pastoral counselors (New Hampshire), "drugless healing" (e.g.,
Illinois and Washington), social psychotherapy (Texas), recreational thera-
pist (Utah), and alcoholism and drug counselors (Virginia).' 2
Among professions, there has been a debate over multi-level licensing.
Who should be included within licensing provisions and the qualifications
for licensure? In psychology, for example, most states license only those
with doctorates. The issue has focused on the potential licensure or certifica-
110. Levit, Sabshin & Meuller, Trends in Graduate Medical Education and Specialty Certi-
fication, 290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 545 (1974). See Taylor & Torrey, The Pseudo-Regulation of
American Psychiatry, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 34 (1972); Karson, Regulating Medical Psycho-
therapists in Illinois: A Question of Balance, 11 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 601 (1978).
111. See Kern, State Regulation of Social Work, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 261 (1976); Rutledge,
State Regulation of Marriage Counseling, 22 FAM. COORDINATOR 81 (1973); Snow, Counselor
Licensure as Perceived by Counselors and Psychologists, 60 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J. 80
(1981); Swanson, Moving Toward Counselor Licensure: A Statewide Survey, 60 PERSONNEL &
GUIDANCE J. 78 (1981).
112. 2 D. HOGAN, THE REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 57-69, 97-110 (1979).
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tion of master's-level psychologists.1 13 In social work some states have
agreed to license social workers with a bachelor's degree. 1 4 These debates
are not generally whether the lower level degree should qualify the profes-
sional for the same license as the higher degree, but rather whether a holder
of the lower level degree should be recognized by the state at all or permitted
to engage in independent practice. Often there is concern that multilevel
licensing will confuse the public and weaken the prestige and respect of the
higher level license. Such disputes have sometimes defeated licensing for the
profession, or required a compromise that essentially provides for multilevel
licensing. When it does occur, the lower levels are generally given a different
title and are required to work under the supervision of a holder of the higher
level license.
The Licensing Process
Licensure is a matter of state law. There is considerable variance from
state to state on the professions that are licensed and on the details of the
licensing law. Licensure is generally a statutory and regulatory matter and
there are relatively few appellate cases dealing with mental health
licensing. 11 5
Although requirements vary considerably from state-to-state and from
profession-to-profession within the same state, there are several common ele-
ments.l16 Among these common elements are completion of an academic
degree, passage of a licensing examination, completion of supervised work
experience or internship, and demonstration of good moral and ethical
character.
Professions and states vary concerning the kind of education required for
113. See McMillan, Professional Standards and the Master's Level Psychologist, 4 PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRAC. 296 (1973); Wayne, An Examination of Selected Statutory
Licensing Requirements for Psychologists in the United States, 60 PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE J.
420 (1982).
114. See Hardcastle, Public Regulation of Social Work, 22 Soc. WORK 14 (1977).
115. In the relatively few appellate cases involving licensing, the major issues have been
due process (did the state provide a fair hearing or clear standards for discipline) or whether a
degree meets the educational requirements for a license. E.g., Aronson v. Hall, 707 F.2d 693
(2d Cir. 1983); Larkin v. Winthrow, 368 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 35
(1975); In re Partin, 37 N.C. App. 302, 246 S.E.2d 519 (1978).
116. For a discussion of provisions contained in licensing statutes see, B. FRETZ & D.
MILLS, LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND COUNSELORS (1980); 2 D.
HOGAN, THE REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS (vol. 2) (1979); Wayne, An Examination
of Selected Statutory Licensing Requirements for Psychologists in the United States, 60 PERSON-
NEL & GUIDANCE J. 420 (1982).
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licensure."i 7 Some type of accreditation is essential if an educational re-
quirement is to have any meaning. Without accreditation, diploma mills
could grant meaningless degrees and effectively destroy the education re-
quirement. Professional associations, such as the American Psychological
Association or the National Association of Social Workers, usually have
some system of educational accreditation.'18 In some states, however, the
education requirement for licensure may be met without graduation from a
professionally approved school." 19 Regional accreditation may be used to
meet the educational requirement. The difficulty with regional accreditation
is that it is not oriented toward the needs of one profession but rather toward
an entire institution (e.g., a university) and, therefore, does not deal with the
quality of the professional training program, and it tends to have relatively
low standards for accreditation.
120
Another issue involving the education requirement is what types of train-
ing qualify for training requirement.' 2 ' For example, while the Psy.D. or a
Ph.D. in clinical psychology would qualify as training for licensure in psy-
chology, would a Ph.D. in counseling or a Ph.D. or Ed.D. in education psy-
chology qualify? Generally these questions are left to the licensing board
and its decisions are accepted so long as the board makes a decision consis-
tent with its own policies and the state statute. 122
Licensing examinations generally contain a written component which may
117. See generally Kiesler, The Training of Psychiatrists and Psychologists, in Psychology
and National Health Insurance (C. Kiesler, N. Cummings & G. VandenBos eds. 1980).
118. Ensuring rigorous educational requirements through accreditation is a problem for
many professions. This occurs because of the failure of the profession to require professional
accreditation (some mental health professions), the failure to deal adequately with foreign
school graduates (medicine), or the failure of the accrediting agency to implement rigorous
standards. See Smith, Accreditation Revisited: ABA Reexamination ofApproved Law Schools,
27 WAYNE L. REV. 95 (1980).
119. Wiens & Menne, On Disposing of "Straw People," or, An Attempt to Clarify Statutory
Recognition and Educational Requirements for Psychologists, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 390
(1981). States could choose to require graduation from a fully accredited (professional associa-
tion) program. Draganosky v. Minnesota Bd. of Psychology, 367 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1985).
120. See generally Goodstein & Ross, Accreditation of Graduate Programs in Psychology-
An Analysis, 21 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 218 (1966); Matarazzo, Higher Education, Professional
Accreditation and Licensure, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 856 (1977).
121. Fox & Barclay, The Foundation of Professional Psychology, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
306 (1982); Kayton, Statutory Regulation of Psychologists: Its Scope and Constitutionality, 33
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 249 (1959); Wiens & Menne, supra note 119.
122. Smith, Psychology and the Courts: Some Implications of Recent Decisions for State
Licensing Boards, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRAC. 489 (1978); Wallace, Occupa-
tional Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46 (1972);
Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097 (1973). The
difficulties in adequately assessing competency are reviewed in EVALUATING THE SKILLS OF
MEDICAL SPECIALISTS (J. Lloyd & D. Langsley eds. 1983).
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be supplemented by an oral examination or practicum exam (patient diagno-
sis or counseling). These examinations are commonly written or adminis-
tered by the state board which also provides for scoring them and determines
what "passing" scores are.
The supervised work experience or practicum is meant to ensure that dur-
ing the initial years of practice the professional has the guidance necessary to
deal with the complexities of practice. It is a transition period between the
intense supervision that is supposed to be part of academic training and the
relative lack of supervision of fully licensed practice. In addition, it serves
the function of a "probationary" period in that gross incompetence or uneth-
ical conduct during the internship might result in the denial of a full license.
The character and fitness aspect of licensing is intended to protect the
public from dishonest and unethical behavior. Serious acts of dishonesty,
such as crimes of moral turpitude or failure to meet fiduciary responsibility,
can be the reason for refusing to license an otherwise fully qualified appli-
cant. But few applicants are denied on this basis, perhaps in part because
many educational institutions would not accept such students into training
programs, 123 and perhaps because the state licensing boards have not made
great efforts to uncover prior dishonest behavior.
Licensing requirements may seem somewhat redundant: what is the need
for an educational requirement if there is a licensing exam that could test the
applicant's knowledge? Why have an internship when similar experience
should have been provided as part of training? In fact, these provisions are
intentionally redundant, in part, to provide checks on various parts of the
process. Inadequately prepared applicants who somehow get through a
training program may be stopped by the exam. In addition, examination
results impose restraints on weak training programs; a number of exam fail-
ures from one school may indicate a need to increase the academic rigor of
that program. The internship may expose seriously incompetent practition-
ers, or help to compensate for any weaknesses in the training program.
Licensing is done by state licensing boards, generally appointed by the
governor, or other state and professional officials. The controlling majority
of the boards are usually made up of the members of the regulated profes-
sion. In addition to responsibility for the examination and initial licensing
function, most boards are charged with the duty of revoking licenses and
imposing other forms of discipline (described below).124
123. B. FRETZ & D. MILLS, LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND
COUNSELORS (1981).
124. Comment, Procedural Due Process and the Separation of Functions in State Occupa-
tional Licensing Agencies, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 833. For a general review of licensing and spe-
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Practicing without a license is generally a misdemeanor carrying a maxi-
mum penalty of a fine and a short jail term. Prosecution for unauthorized
mental health practice is very infrequent and, unless there is fraud or a pa-
tient is seriously harmed, it often does not result in significant penalties when
it does occur.
Licensure is controlled by each state, and generally a license is valid for
practice only in the state which has granted it. There commonly are excep-
tions for emergency or short-term practice. Some states will recognize the
license of another state as the basis for granting a license. As with licensing
provisions themselves, reciprocity provisions vary widely.
After initial licensure, relicensing essentially becomes a registration proce-
dure. A license holder may be required to provide information about type
and location of practice, and to pay a fee. However, there are no license
renewal examinations, or any serious review of professional competence.
This is similar to the licensing provisions of all types. It means, however,
that it is virtually impossible for licensing authorities to assure the continued
competence of those relicensed. 125 This absence of reexamination may in
part be based on the assumption that once licensed, practitioners increase
the level of competence in the areas in which they actually practice and,
therefore, reexamination is unnecessary. It may also reflect the political re-
ality that licensing statutes are developed by those in the licensed profession
and they generally would not be very enthusiastic about having to take li-
censing exams throughout their careers.
Continuing education is viewed by some as one way of helping to ensure
the continued competence of professionals. In some instances continuing
education "credits" or hours are required to maintain a license. Although
the success of compulsory continuing education is debatable, these courses
should at least provide the opportunity for professionals to stay abreast of
some of the latest developments in their areas of practice. 126
Discipline and License Revocation
Licensing boards generally have an obligation to discipline, or to revoke
the licenses of professionals who engage in misconduct or are unfit to con-
cial certification legal issues, see LEGAL ASPECTS OF CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION
(L. Langsley ed. 1983).
125. Small, Recertification for Psychiatrists: The Time to Act is Now., 132 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 291 (1975).
126. See Brown & Uhl, Mandatory Continuing Education: Sense or Nonsense?, 213
J.A.M.A. 1660 (1970). The continuing education requirements for a variety of professionals
are set out in Jaschik, More States are Requiring Professionals to Take Continuing-Education
Courses, Chronicle of Higher Ed., May 21, 1986, at 13, 16.
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tinue practice. The bases for imposing discipline or revoking a license vary,
but generally include incompetence to continue practice, unfitness because of
alcohol or drug addiction, illegal activity that reflects on trust or professional
standing, and serious unethical misconduct.127 The board is usually empow-
ered to promulgate regulations that specify the grounds for revoking licenses
and to take a variety of disciplinary actions ranging from a private repri-
mand to suspension or revocation of the license. 128
Professional discipline involves punitive action on behalf of the state, and
the removal of a license is the taking of property. Therefore, a state licensing
board must comply with constitutional due process requirements when disci-
plinary action is taken, which at least requires that the board provide the
accused professional an opportunity to present and challenge evidence. To
respond to the claims against them, practitioners must be given a fairly clear
statement of the claims of misconduct. To avoid inadvertently engaging in
prohibited activities, professionals must be given a reasonably clear under-
standing of the conduct that is prohibited. This does not, of course, require
the specificity of a criminal code, but the law must give fair notice of what
acts are prohibited.
A disciplinary proceeding is generally a formal hearing, held before the
board or a hearing officer appointed by the board. It is common for the
professional who is the subject of the hearing to be represented by an attor-
ney, and to present witnesses and evidence to the board. A state attorney, or
an attorney hired by the board, generally presents the evidence for discipline.
Those seeking to impose discipline generally have the burden of proof.
Disciplinary actions against mental health practitioners are rare. 129 Most
state boards are understaffed, many have no full-time professional staff mem-
bers, and few have full-time investigators trained to discover unethical or
incompetent practice. Boards almost always respond only to complaints
filed with them, rather than seeking out incompetent practitioners. Most do
not have the resources to conduct adequate investigations of complaints.
127. W. VANHOOSE & J. KOTTLER, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN COUNSELING AND
PSYCHOLOGY (1977).
128. Smith, supra note 122.
129. Hogan reported that a survey of state boards of licensure revealed that on average
they received only about one complaint per year per board. From the time of the establish-
ment of state boards until 1972, only five licenses or certificates were revoked. D. HOGAN,
supra note 116, at 260. During a one-year review, there were only 61 complaints of unethical
conduct with the central office of the American Psychiatric Association. Id. at 334; Butler &
Williams, Description of Ohio State Board of Psychology Hearings on Ethical Violations from
1972 to the Present, 16 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRAC. 502 (1985) (only 11 ethical
violations were determined by the Ohio board in 13 years). However, the number of com-
plaints is increasing.
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Moreover, professionals are generally unwilling to file complaints against
their peers, so patients may become the major source of complaints, and
mistreated patients are often reluctant to expose their mental health histo-
ries. In addition, because there is no single method of treating many mental
health conditions, many patients may not know that they have been harmed
or mistreated. The inability or unwillingness of the boards to deal aggres-
sively with inadequate or unethical practitioners is a major weakness of most
professional licensure. 130
Licensing can be an important method of enforcing professional ethics
and a serious breach may be the basis for revoking a license. Therefore,
ethical codes are more than general statements of professional ideals. They
become the basis for the continued right to practice. If codes of ethics are
effective in protecting the public from dishonesty, inadequate service, or un-
fair advantage, then licensing is a method of fulfilling the profession's obliga-
tion to protect the public. Unfortunately, many professional codes of ethics
are vague and often combine aspirational statements with minimum ethical
standards. As a result, the ethical standards generally serve as the basis for
board action only in the most outrageous cases of dishonesty (stealing from a
patient or making fraudulent insurance claims for services not rendered) or
taking advantage of a patient (sexual relations with a patient). It is impor-
tant that codes of ethics make some clear distinction between the goals or
aspirations of the profession, and the minimum level of professional conduct
required of all practitioners.
Beyond Licensing
Licensing involves the minimum qualifications necessary to practice a pro-
fession. Higher standards may be established by groups for membership or
special certification. For example, the American Board of Professional Psy-
chologists (ABPP) and the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology
(ABPN) have requirements for certification that extend well beyond those
required by states to practice psychology or medicine. Such forms of certifi-
cation are not part of the state licensing process. 13 1
These forms of credentialing may be useful to other professionals when
130. The reluctance of patients to file licensing complaints probably reflects their reluc-
tance to file mental health malpractice claims. S. SMITH & R. MEYER, LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND
MENTAL HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE 8-10 (1987). See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR (1966); Thackrey, Breakdown in Profes-
sional Self-Monitoring: Private Practice Announcement, 16 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH
& PRAC. 163 (1985).
131. In a few instances membership in a specialty board may be accepted as the basis for
licensing. For example, some states will accept ABPP as the basis for licensing.
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making referrals. They may also be useful to the public in selecting a thera-
pist and to third-party reimbursement plans. Unfortunately, few people un-
derstand the significance of these credentials and even when they do, they
may be misled by other groups with similar sounding names that impose
much less stringent requirements for certification. Many of the functions of
labeling licensing would be better served if the public were more aware of the
importance of these special credentialing services, if misleading similar titles
were prohibited, and if the professions would make available to the public
lists of certification boards with rigorous standards. Such a process might be
opposed by those without the certification, but it would encourage practi-
tioners to seek board approval.
132
Criticism of Licensing
Mental health licensing is criticized for unnecessarily limiting the supply
of practitioners and thereby reducing the availability of and increasing the
price of mental health services, for stifling innovation, for making it difficult
for paraprofessionals to perform effectively, for decreasing geographic mobil-
ity and distribution of professionals, and for discriminating against groups
that find it most difficult to get the credentials necessary for practice (minori-
ties and women) and that suffer most from an insufficiency of practition-
ers. 133 At the same time, licensure is criticized for being ineffective in
eliminating the incompetent or harmful from practice.13 4 Together, these
criticisms almost suggest that the licensing process is preventing the compe-
tent from practicing, and permitting the incompetent to practice. 135
The criticisms, while probably overstated, demonstrate some problems.
Because the very purpose of licensing is to eliminate from practice those who
are not of a minimum level of competence, the licensing process undoubtedly
reduces the number of practitioners. This probably tends to increase prices
somewhat, and makes services less readily available to some. To the extent
it reduces the number of "unnecessary" practitioners, however, it may tend
132. See Wellner & Zimet, The National Register ofHealth Service Providers in Psychology,
in THE PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST'S HANDBOOK 185 (B. Sales ed. 1983). But see Clovis,
The Boards-What Price Glory, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 784 (1971).
133. E.g., D. Hogan, supra note 116, at 39.
134. E.g., S. GROSS, supra note 106. Frieberg, The Song Is Ended but the Malady Lingers
On: Legal Regulation of Psychotherapy, 22 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 519 (1978).
135. M. GROSS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCHOTHERAPY, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (1978); R.
REINEHR, THE MACHINE THAT OILS ITSELF: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE MENTAL HEALTH
ESTABLISHMENT (1975); Somers, Accountability, Public Policy, and Psychiatry, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 959 (1977).
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to reduce treatment that is not necessary or desirable. '36 Licensing may also
somewhat inhibit innovation. On the other hand, claims of innovation may
be an excuse for quackery. The real question is whether licensing reduces
effective innovations more than it protects against ineffective or even danger-
ous ones. If licensing discourages the use of paraprofessionals, that is unde-
sirable only if it prevents them from doing things that need not be done by
professionals.
There are undesirable consequences of licensing, whether or not one
agrees with all of the criticisms described above. The process is time-con-
suming, requires state resources, may suggest to the public greater compe-
tency than it actually assures, and will result in some incorrect decisions.
The primary question is whether these costs are worth the benefits in im-
proved mental health care and in the avoidance of quackery and fraud. This
is a calculation that cannot be performed with precision, and trying to guess
about it is the major source of debate about the desirability of mental health
licensing.
Another question is whether licensing is successful in ensuring minimum
levels of competence. An argument can be made that it does not. Few appli-
cants are denied licenses because they are never able to pass the examination
or because of character and fitness considerations. In reality, the educa-
tional requirement is probably the major requirement limiting licensure, and
it may become even less effective if there are no rigorous accreditation stan-
dards. Another weakness in ensuring minimum competency-one shared
with other professions-is that very few practitioners have their licenses re-
voked. There are few efforts to seek out unethical professionals and remove
them from practice. Furthermore, the absence of relicensing provisions
makes it unlikely that practitioners who become incompetent will be de-
tected and their licenses revoked. 13
7
Some form of mental health licensure is desirable. In the absence of label
licensing, mistakes about the quality of the professionals would be common.
There are undoubtedly some procedures that are sufficiently dangerous that
they should be undertaken only by qualified experts. There is a social, as
well as an individual, interest in ensuring that mental health services are
136. The story is told of the therapist who denied that he provided any unnecessary ther-
apy. He reported, "I don't put someone in therapy unless I absolutely need the money."
There exists a danger that if there are too many professionals they may unnecessarily place
some people in extended treatment programs or extend treatment longer than necessary. Be-
cause much mental health treatment does not have clear, standard protocols, overtreatment is
particularly a potential problem in psychotherapy.
137. Bernstein & LeComte, Licensure in Psychology: Alternative Directions, 12 PROF. PSY-
CHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRAC. 200 (1981).
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performed by competent professionals. The personal interest is clear-the
individual wants effective treatment. Others also have an interest in ensur-
ing competent mental health activities. For example, if the services are paid
for by insurance or Medicare or Medicaid, there is a social interest in ensur-
ing that reasonably competent services are provided. There is also a broad
social interest in reducing antisocial activity, and to the extent that effective
treatment may reduce it, competent treatment ought to be ensured.
Improving Mental Health Licensing
The current state of licensing has caused some to urge that mental health
licensing in its present form be eliminated. Hogan has proposed that the
state register mental health professionals and require that they make infor-
mation, including experience and academic training, statement of ethical be-
liefs, proposed length of treatment, and results that are to be expected
available to the public.138 Such a proposal has the advantage of making
available a maximum amount of information about a therapist, while al-
lowing a significant form of competition to exist. However, it is certainly not
realistic to expect most patients who need medical or mental health services
to be able to carefully study the various therapists in order to choose the
right or qualified ones. Certainly an argument can be made that in such
times of need, many patients cannot conduct a "Consumer Report" review
of the options available to them. Nor is it reasonable to expect that states
could enforce compliance with claims made by therapists in these reports to
the public. As a result fraud could easily become a significant problem.
A system of licensing that works well may serve both the professions and
the public. The problem with the current system may be that it works
neither in eliminating the incompetent and unethical, nor in providing the
advantages of a freely competitive market. The compromises that have pro-
duced licensing laws have resulted in the worst of both worlds for the public;
many of the costs of regulation are present but the potential benefits of licen-
sure regulation are reduced by the weak licensing provisions currently en-
forced. To best serve the public, licensing procedures should be significantly
strengthened and restructured as described below.
1. If practice licensing (limits on who can perform services) is to be un-
dertaken, the services within the definition of the practice must be much
more clearly set out either by statute or by regulation. The definitions now
used are extremely broad and often worthless. For example, a proposed
model licensing act for psychology defines the practice of psychology as
"rendering any psychological service involving the application of principles,
138. D. HOGAN, supra note 116, at 361-62.
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methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting and influencing be-
havior . . , the methods and procedures of interviewing, counseling, and
psychotherapy; of constructing, administering and interpreting tests of
mental abilities .... and of assessing public opinion." 139 A model social
work act defines the practice of social work as "service and action to affect
changes in human behavior, a person's or persons emotional responses, and
the social conditions of individuals, families, groups, organizations, and
communities, which are influenced by the interaction of social, cultural,
political, and economic systems."'"' These definitions apply to the activities
of much of the population. They are so broad as to be worthless.
2. The educational requirements should be more clearly defined. For
example, whether a counseling doctoral degree is sufficient for one to be li-
censed as a clinical psychologist should be rather clearly determined. This
should be based not on labeling, but on content, and, therefore, could be
most efficiently performed through rigorous accreditation.
3. The accreditation of educational programs should be strengthened.
In the long run, maintaining an effective education requirement requires a
dependable accreditation process that prevents diploma-mill operations.
Most states do not depend on rigorous national professional accreditation to
determine which educational programs provide sufficiently sound educa-
tional programs to fulfill licensing requirements. Few state boards are
equipped to conduct full and adequate accreditation reviews within their
own state, and none is able to conduct adequate reviews of programs outside
their own states. As a result, education accreditation for licensure tends to
be haphazard and without very high standards and this seriously weakens
licensing educational requirements. Licensing should require graduation
from an educational program accredited by the nationally recognized profes-
sional body.
4. The use of titles that are similar to other licensing titles should be
prohibited. Thus, if use of the title "psychologist" requires a license, the use
of terms such as "psychotherapist" or "psychocounselor" by those not li-
censed should also be prohibited. States should be particularly careful to
avoid using similar titles for different, licensed professionals. For example,
"certified psychologist" should not be used to designate a master's-level pro-
fessional (required to practice under supervision) if "licensed psychologist"
139. American Psychological Association (Committee on State Legislation), A Model for
State Legislation Affecting the Practice of Psychology 1967, 22 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1095 (1977)
(later revised).
140. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, LEGAL REGULATION OF SOCIAL
WORK PRACTICE (1973). See also NICHOLS, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY COUNSELING: A LEG-
ISLATIVE HANDBOOK (1974).
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indicates a doctoral-level, independent practitioner. The similarity is likely
to be confusing to the public and thereby defeat the purpose of title licensing.
5. The label "psychiatrist" should be limited to those with special train-
ing and recognized ability in psychiatry. It is likely that the public is cur-
rently misled about the qualifications of some claiming to practice
psychiatry. At a minimum, title licensing of psychiatrists should be
undertaken.
6. Character and fitness reviews should be more thoroughly conducted,
and boards should be less reluctant to use past dishonesty as the basis for
denying state licenses. Licensure discipline in one state should generally be a
disqualification for licensure in another state. Each profession should estab-
lish a central national registry of disciplinary action and complaints to detect
the unethical practitioner who moves from one state to another.
7. State boards should be much more aggressive in seeking out the un-
ethical or incompetent practitioner for discipline. Complaints to the board
should be thoroughly investigated by experienced staff. The public should
be reminded that the licensure board is available to receive complaints and
the board should actively seek information from those who might have com-
plaints. To the extent possible consistent with due process, the confidential-
ity of patients and clients with complaints should be recognized. This
recommendation would unquestionably require the addition of staff and
funding for state boards.
8. State boards should be more inclined to impose significant penalties
for any serious breach of ethical rules and for incompetency.
9. Some form of relicensing should be required to demonstrate contin-
ued competency in the area of practice or subspecialization.
10. Efforts should be made to inform the public of various levels of certifi-
cation that go beyond licensing. Professionally recognized diplomate or cer-
tification status should be explained to the public.
11. If clearly defined practice licensing is used, states should more vigor-
ously prosecute the unauthorized or unlicensed practice of the profession.
Such prosecutions now are extremely unusual.
OTHER LIMITATIONS ON PRACTICE
Mental health practice is also controlled by the regulation of hospital priv-
ileges and authority to prescribe drugs. Because services will ordinarily be
provided only if they can be paid for, the reimbursement issue, described in
earlier sections, is also an important form of indirect mental health care
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regulation. 141
Hospital Privileges
Traditionally, authority to practice independently in hospitals and to ad-
mit patients to hospitals has been limited to physicians. Therefore, psychia-
trists have been the only mental health professionals with hospital privileges.
While other mental professionals can be called upon to assist in a hospital,
they operate at least in theory under the direction of a physician. A mental
health professional seeing a patient who needs hospitalization, of course,
must refer the patient to a physician for admission. In a few areas of the
country, however, limited hospital privileges have been granted to some non-
physician mental health professionals, while elsewhere the issue is a matter
of hot debate.
Staff privileges are granted by each hospital according to its own criteria.
However, hospital accreditation standards play a significant role in the pro-
cess. Since 1951, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH) has been the major accrediting body for hospitals. 4 2 Although it is
a voluntary accrediting body, many third-party payers (including federal
health programs) depend upon JCAH accreditation. The JCAH regulations
have reflected the physicians' control of the policies of that organization.
Until recently, the accreditation standards permitted hospitals to grant staff
privileges only to physicians. Recently, however, the medical staff of the
hospital has been redefined to include in addition "licensed individuals per-
mitted by law and the hospital to provide patient care services independently
in the hospital."' i4 3 Several states have by statute provided that licensed psy-
chologists and others may be granted staff privileges."
Even without such specific statutory authority hospitals may be able to
grant staff privileges to such professions. Not surprisingly, however, most
hospitals have not immediately started to grant privileges to nonphysician
141. See supra notes 50-99 and accompanying text.
142. See Zaro, Batchelor, Ginsberg & Pallak, Psychology and the JCAH: Reflections of a
Decade of Struggle, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1342 (1982). The JCAH was developed by the
American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, the American College of
Surgeons and the American College of Physicians. The American Dental Association is now
part of the JCAH structure. Lieberman & Astrachan, The JCAH and Psychiatry: Current
Issues and Implications for Practice, 35 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1205 (1984).
143. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITALS (1984).
144. California, Georgia, and the District of Columbia have led in the development of a
statutory authority for psychologists to be given staff privileges. Currie, Legislative Initiatives
in Hospital Practice (paper presented to American Psychological Association 1983)). See
Copeland, Hospital Privileges and Staff Membership for Psychologists, 11 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY:
RESEARCH & PRAC. 676 (1983).
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mental health professionals. Threats of antitrust lawsuits have in some cases
encouraged the hospitals to consider it. One basis for the antitrust claim is
that refusal of privileges is a conspiracy to restrain trade by reducing compe-
tition through the refusal to let qualified professionals into the hospital
"market." Indeed, the threat of antitrust action probably played an instru-
mental role in the JCAH decision to amend its criteria.145
There are several reasons for these efforts to expand privileges. Without
them, some mental health professionals claim that treatment may be dis-
rupted or interrupted when a patient enters the hospital. It is argued that if
they could admit the patient to the hospital and continue to direct their care,
treatment would improve. Others argue that the refusal to grant staff privi-
leges reduces competition and thereby economically harms both patients and
nonphysician mental health professionals. 146 At the same time, mental
health training programs are now sufficiently complete to ensure adequate
knowledge to direct the hospital treatment programs of some mental pa-
tients. Therefore, it is argued, it is unnecessary for a licensing physician to
further ensure the qualifications of those trained for independent practice.
The nature of hospital practice, at least in larger hospitals, has changed.
Physicians are now commonly limited to practicing only in their specialties.
New methods of health care delivery may rely heavily on those with staff
privileges and care providers. For example, preferred provider organizations
(PPOs) may be structured around professionals with privileges at a particu-
lar hospital or set of hospitals. 147 Without being part of the staff, mental
health professionals may be excluded from these important new forms of
health care. In addition, the hospital staff plays an important role in the
governance of hospitals and in the assurance of quality care.' 4 8 Without
staff privileges, mental health professionals cannot fully participate in this
process.
There are also numerous arguments against permitting nonphysician staff
privileges. For one, they are not licensed to perform a full range of services;
145. Bershoff, Hospital Privileges and the Antitrust Laws, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1238
(1983). See generally Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476
(4th Cir.), on remand, 501 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Va. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981);
Dolan & Ralston, Hospital Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REV. 707
(1981); Drexel, The Antitrust Implications of the Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 207 (1982); Kissam, Government Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and
Certification: The Antitrust Laws and Other Procompetitive Strategies, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1.
146. Bershoff, supra note 145; Tanney, Hospital Privileges for Psychologists, 38 AM. PSY-
CHOLOGIST 1232 (1983).
147. Altman & Frisman, Preferred Provider Organizations and Mental Health Care, 38
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 359 (1987).
148. See G. TISCHLER & B. ASTRANCHAN, QUALITY ASSURANCE IN MENTAL HEALTH:
PEER AND UTILIZATION REVIEW (1982).
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for another, their philosophy of treatment may not be consistent with the
medical models on which hospitals are typically structured. Others argue
that their training programs are inadequate to prepare them for independent
work in a hospital setting and, therefore, the quality of care may be inferior
to that which could be provided by physicians.149 Physician control over
staff admission policies is, of course, one practical reason that privileges have
been rejected.
There is by no means complete agreement within the nonphysician mental
health professions that staff privileges are desirable. Some claim such status
would increase the public esteem and recognition of the professions, while
others suggest that they would change the nature and focus of professional
practice, education, and treatment approaches. Still others fear a continuing
adversarial relationship with psychiatrists and other physicians within the
hospitals.
JCAH accepting nonphysician practitioners, the developing concept of
limited staff privileges, and the increasing respect and public acknowledg-
ment of a variety of mental health practitioners all suggest that the move
toward hospital staff privileges for mental health professionals will probably
continue at a slow pace. Hospitals will still be able to restrict staff privileges.
They need not admit everyone with the licensing or academic credentials
necessary for practice. They may require special levels of education, experi-
ence, and quality of practice; they may impose very high standards for non-
physicians; and they may narrowly define the kinds of activities that mental
health professionals may perform, require substantial consultation with the
physicians, and limit the participation of mental health professionals in staff
governance.
Prescription Drugs
Currently, psychiatrists are the only mental health practitioners permitted
to order prescription drugs for patients. All other physicians are also li-
censed to prescribe psychoactive drugs to patients whether or not those phy-
sicians have specialized training in psychiatry or neurology.
The control of prescription drugs is a matter of both federal and state law.
Federal law establishes the basic regulation and approval of medication (in-
cluding the classification of compounds as over-the-counter or prescription
149. See generally American Psychiatric Statement, Position Statement on Hospital Privi-
leges for Psychologists, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458 (1981). See also Elfant, Psychotherapy
and Assessment in Hospital Settings." Ideological and Professional Conflicts, 16 PROF. PSY-
CHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRAC. 55 (1985) (involvement in hospitals may lead to "implicit
identification with values and principles alien to the discipline of psychology").
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drugs); state law deals with the licensing of specific individuals permitted to
prescribe medication.
In many ways, issues concerning the authority to prescribe drugs are simi-
lar to those raised about hospital staff privileges. The arguments for author-
izing some nonphysician mental health professionals to prescribe
psychopharmacological agents are that drugs have become an important
part of psychotherapy; restrictions on the professionals permitted to pre-
scribe drugs increases costs; and psychologists, social workers, and others
should be able to integrate drug therapy with other forms of psychotherapy.
Those in favor of limited prescription authority point to the authority
granted to dentists and optometrists to use some prescription drugs and de-
vices. Yet, it is also argued that most current mental health education pro-
grams lack adequate training in pharmacology to justify such authority and
that most of these programs would find it philosophically contrary to their
treatment approaches. Others claim that prescription authority might en-
courage mental health professionals to rely too heavily on drugs. Again, the
political reality is that expansion of prescribing authority would face consid-
erable opposition from physicians.
To date, there has not been much professional effort to obtain prescribing
authority, in part because there is little likelihood of success in the near fu-
ture. Unless there is a considerable increase in conditions for which there is
a clearly effective drug therapy, it is unlikely that nonpsychiatric professions
will seek authority to prescribe drugs.
THE PHILOSOPHY AND FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
The current story of the mental health delivery system is not a very happy
one. The direct controls (licensing and, to some degree other limitations on
practice) have not ensured quality of care. Furthermore, the current sub-
stantial unmet need for services reflects the absence of adequate reimburse-
ment schemes. Government programs have provided some services for the
indigent with serious mental problems and limited services for others.' 50
Private health insurance, usually provided through employers, has generally
provided only minimal mental health benefits. Other services have been
purchased directly by those needing them. Thus, the determination of how
much service will be available and who will get the services has depended on
political considerations (government programs), employee benefits, and abil-
ity to pay for services. The medically indigent, middle and lower socioeco-
nomic groups, often do not fare well under such a system because of the
150. Frazier & Parron, The Federal Mental Health Agenda, in THE FUTURE OF MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES: COPING WITH CRISIS (L. Duhl & N. Cummings eds. 1986).
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inability to privately purchase mental health services. The goal of making
mental health services available to all Americans regardless of the ability to
pay has largely gone unfulfilled.
Competition and Mental Health Care
Until recently, health care was becoming an increasingly regulated part of
the economy. During the last few years this trend has been reversed and
there are now efforts to impose market-like discipline, intended to improve
efficiency by reducing costs while maintaining service. The increased appli-
cability of antitrust laws, the use of DRGs for Medicare reimbursement, and
the development of PPOs and HMOs have added elements of competition.
The consequences of these changes, while far from certain, have the poten-
tial for substantially increasing the use of outpatient mental health
services. 51
Efforts to reduce health care costs have sometimes resulted in the loss of
mental health care services from insurance,"5 2 but the potential for mental
health care services to reduce total health care cost may ultimately en-
courage the provision of these services to the poor, and medically indigent
lower and middle income families. 1  In the absence of proof that one form
of therapy is more effective than another, or that one class of mental health
professionals is more effective than another, there may be a trend toward
providing services through lower-cost rather than higher-cost professionals.
The incentives to avoid inpatient care will undoubtedly increase.
There is a risk, however, that mental health services may become less
available in the push to cut costs. If mental health care continues to be
viewed as a nonessential extra and unrelated to physical health care costs,
then these will be among the first services to be cut. The reduction in gov-
ernment-funded mental health services and private insurance contracts sug-
gests that mental health may be viewed as desirable but not essential or even
151. Compare Flinn, McMahon & Collins, Health Maintenance Organizations and Their
Implications for Psychiatry, 38 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 255 (1987); Marshall,
HMOs and Psychiatry: Could There Be a Silver Lining?, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 35
(1987) with Altman & Frisman, Preferred Provider Organizations and Mental Health Care, 38
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 359 (1987); Martinsons, Are HMOs Slamming the Door
on Psychiatric Treatment?, 62 HOSPITALS 50 (1988).
152. Rinella, Ethical Issues and Psychiatric Cost-containment Strategies, 9 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 125 (1986).
153. Marshall, supra note 151. See Flinn, McMahon & Collins, Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations and Their Implications for Psychiatry, 38 Hose. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 255
(1987); Feldman & Goldman, Mental Health in HMOs: Practice and Potential, in THE FU-
TURE OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: COPING WITH CRISIS (L. Duhl & N. Cummings eds.
1986).
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important. Evidence concerning the overall health care cost with and with-
out the inclusion of mental health care services suggests that cutting mental
health services may be costly in the long run. The challenge to those pro-
moting mental health benefits is to continue to develop data demonstrating
the cost-effectiveness of mental health services generally and of specific
forms of therapy.154
National Health Insurance
The most comprehensive form of government regulation of health care is
national health insurance. The United States is the only major industrial
country without such a program. 5 ' Depending on one's point of view, this
either represents one reason for the high level of quality of medical services
available within the country or the reason for the high percentage of gross
national product devoted to them. The United States has some elements of
national health insurance.15 6 The Medicare system, for example, provides
general health coverage for the elderly; Medicaid for the indigent has similar
elements. The expansion of catastrophic care will expand the federal portion
of health care. Government expenditures for health care may represent 40
percent to 50 percent of health care services. 15 7
Although the broad universal coverage of national health insurance does
not appear to be imminent in the United States, it is likely that the debate
about it will continue. In addition, discussion continues about the desirabil-
ity of expanding current federal health programs in ways that would, in ef-
fect, move the country closer to universal coverage.
National health insurance would not necessarily be comprehensive in
154. Cummings & Duhl, The New Delivery System, in THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES: COPING WITH CRISIS (L. Duhl & N. Cummings eds. 1986); Schlefer, The Econom-
ics of Mental Health Care in a Changing Economics and Health Care Environment, in THE
FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: COPING WITH CRISIS (L. Duhl & N. Cummings
ed. 1986).
155. Not all mental health delivery problems are solved under national health insurance
programs as mental health programs in Europe demonstrate. See L. GOSTIN, MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES: LAW AND PRACTICE (1986); Hoyer, The Control-Commissions in Norwe-
gian Mental Health Care, 9 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 469 (1987); Jansen, Mental Health
Policy: Observations from Europe, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1273 (1986); Williams & Shapland,
The Code of Practice: Strengthening the Legalist Philosophy?, 11 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1
(1988).
156. See -generally K. DAVIS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (1975); NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE: CONFLICTING GOALS AND POLICY CHOICES (J. Feder, J. Holahan &
T. Marmor eds. 1980); PSYCHOLOGY AND NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (C. Kiesler, N.
Cummings, G. VandenBos eds. 1980); D. UPTON, MENTAL HEALTH CARE AND NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE (1983).
157. DeLeon & VandenBos, Psychotherapy Reimbursement in Federal Programs: Political
Factors, in PSYCHOTHERAPY: PRACTICE, RESEARCH, POLICY (G. VandenBos ed. 1980).
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terms of providing complete mental health coverage. In fact, some legisla-
tive proposals have provided for very limited mental health coverage within
a national health insurance program. The reasons for this exclusion are the
same as those for limited coverage: it is difficult to define what conditions
should be covered by the insurance or to determine when the patient is
"cured" or no longer needs treatment; there traditionally has been relatively
limited consumer demand for mental health coverage and thus mental
health may appear to be optional or elective rather than essential; some
mental health care is aimed at personal growth or education rather than
"real" health care; and mental health care is commonly provided outside the
hospital and, therefore, does not fit neatly within hospital-based insurance
plans.
The arguments in favor of including mental health care within national
health insurance are that mental health problems are as real and as painful
as physical disease and those with mental conditions as surely deserve treat-
ment as do those with physical conditions; the failure to provide for outpa-
tient mental health services is likely to result in more expensive hospital
treatment; providing good mental health services (especially outpatient care)
apparently lowers total health care costs; and physical and mental conditions
are related and should be considered together in treating the whole per-
son. 1 If comprehensive mental health coverage proves to be an effective
means of reducing total health care costs, then those services will probably
be covered by future comprehensive national health insurance proposals.
Otherwise the prospect for including broad mental health benefits under na-
tional health insurance will remain bleak.
If mental health coverage is to be included in government programs,
mental health benefits will have to be narrowly and precisely defined. They
should be defined in terms of the treatment of relatively significant mental
distress or conditions and the prevention of these conditions when their de-
velopment is likely. This definition, although imprecise, excludes general
growth therapy, encounter groups, and education. While such activities
may be worthwhile, classifying them as mental health care tends to trivialize
the importance of serious mental health needs. Clearly defined treatment
plans against which individual treatment can be measured or considered are
also needed. Such an approach obviously has problems in terms of failure to
recognize the individual differences among patients, but it is probably neces-
158. See Bums, National Health Insurance: Inclusion of Mental Health Care and Clinical
Psychology, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH & PRAC. 723 (1978); Cummings, The Anatomy
of Psychotherapy Under National Health Insurance, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 711 (1977); Mc-
Sweeney, Including Psychotherapy in National Health Insurance, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 722
(1977).
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sary for third-party payers to be assured that they are not being billed for
unnecessary or experimental treatment.
CONCLUSION
It is estimated that at any given time between 15 percent and 20 percent of
the population is in need of mental health services. Only a small portion of
those needing the services will receive them. Private insurance and govern-
ment programs such as Medicare and Medicaid generally provide only very
limited coverage for mental health services. Even "comprehensive" health
plans such as health maintenance organizations often do not provide full
coverage for mental health services. The federal government as well as state
and local governments directly provide some mental health services. A ma-
jor effort to make mental health services available to everyone has been the
community mental health center program. These programs were never
funded as planned and the goal of making mental health care a right remains
unfulfilled.
Limiting coverage for mental health services, particularly for outpatient
services, may prove to be counterproductive. There is reason to believe that
the availability of good outpatient services may reduce mental health hospi-
talization. It may also be that providing mental health services reduces the
demand for physical health services, thereby reducing the total cost of health
care. It has been difficult to demonstrate the efficacy of one form of psycho-
therapy over other forms. However, data do suggest that mental health care
in general is effective.
The purpose of licensing is to protect the public from incompetent, and,
therefore, dangerous, practitioners and from quacks. In practice, licensing
also provides a formal recognition of the profession, tends to reduce the
number of people admitted to practice, and protects professions from com-
petition. Thus, while licensing has a potential for protecting the public, it
also has a potential for harming it. State licensure laws may prohibit the
performing of certain services without a license (practice laws), prohibit the
use of a title or label without a license (title laws) or require the licensee to
register with the state (registration laws).
There are substantial differences among mental health professions con-
cerning the nature of licensing laws. Psychiatry is essentially without a
license requirement, other than that of a Medical Doctor, and any physician
can claim to be a psychiatrist. Psychology licensing varies considerably
from state-to-state, but most states license doctoral-level physiologists, while
a significant minority also provide some licensing or certification for mas-
ters-level psychologists. Social work generally recognizes various levels of
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licensing depending on educational level. In some states there are also li-
censing laws for marriage or family counseling.
The requirements for licensing ordinarily include the completion of an
academic degree, passage of licensing examination, completion of supervised
work experience, and demonstration of good moral or ethical character.
Once a license is granted, it is fairly uncommon for it to be revoked. There is
generally no requirement for periodic retesting or recertification. State licen-
sure boards are authorized, following appropriate hearings, to remove a li-
cense if they find a professional is incompetent to continue practice, or
otherwise unfit, it is unusual for a state board to take strong disciplinary
action against the holder of a license.
A number of criticisms are leveled against licensing, including that it un-
necessarily limits the supply of practitioners resulting in fewer services at
higher prices, that it stifles innovation, and that it limits the geographical
distribution of mental health services. There is a basis for some of these
criticisms, and a number of reforms would strengthen licensing and help
protect the public.
In addition to licensing there are a number of other limitations on mental
health practice. These include the availability of hospital privileges and au-
thority to prescribe medicines. Both have traditionally been the exclusive
province of physicians, although in some areas of the country other mental
health practitioners have gained limited hospital staff privileges. Recent re-
visions in the accreditation standards for hospitals permit hospitals to grant
staff privileges to nonphysicians under some circumstances. The debate over
hospital staff privileges for nonphysician mental health professionals is likely
to continue, with the trend likely to be toward expansion of privileges. Less
debate has occurred on the desirability of authorizing mental health profes-
sionals with appropriate training to prescribe medicines, but similar argu-
ments can be anticipated.
Major proposals for national health insurance have provided relatively
limited coverage for mental health, consistent with current government poli-
cies in Medicare and Medicaid.
The immediate future for adequate mental health care is not bright. The
long-term outlook is somewhat brighter, although far from certain. To en-
courage adequate ,care, essential mental health services should be separated
from individual growth or education goals, the efficacy of various forms of
treatment should be demonstrated, treatment plans for various conditions
should be articulated by the professions, the ability of mental health care to
reduce total health care cost should be more clearly established, and the
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public should be made aware of the need for and benefits of mental health
care.

